Tug of War by Shelfold Bidwell

Author:Shelfold Bidwell [Bidwell, Shelfold]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 1844150984
Publisher: Pen and Sword
Published: 0101-01-01T00:00:00+00:00

They had hit one bridge in every 190 sorties. There was a marked variation in the construction of Italian bridges and hence in their susceptibility to damage. Most were small targets averaging thirty feet by three hundred and it might take ten missions of thirty aircraft to ensure an 82.2 per cent likelihood of a hit. Even then the bridge might remain serviceable. Naturally, Zuckerman concluded that tactical interdiction should be used only when a battle was in course and only near the battlefield.

It will be remembered that in the first two weeks of February the Combined Chiefs of Staff were impatient with the way the campaign was progressing. On the 10th Arnold wrote to Eaker suggesting that he should use the 2,900 planes at his disposal to blast a way into the Liri valley. Eaker retorted that even if he agreed the army could not make proper use of such support. The army staff had to have accurate locations for the forward troops and have passed them in good time to the air staff, and the assault units had to be ready to jump off the moment the air bombardment stopped, so as to take full advantage of its momentarily stunning effect. He was not in the least confident that the army staff could guarantee either. He preferred the conventional air force strategy, to isolate, or “interdict” the battlefield. Here he had the support of Maitland Wilson. On the 25th Wilson issued the general directive that conflicted with Harding’s plan for a spring offensive. He observed that such an operation should be governed by the air factor; clearly a reflection of Eaker’s ideas. Meanwhile the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), concluding that Eaker’s interdiction plan would not produce quick results, supported Arnold’s idea of using heavy bombers at Cassino. Churchill, who had poured cold water on Wilson’s interdiction plan and approved of Harding’s spring offensive, was not in favour of a pause at Cassino in the meantime. These conflicting ideas influenced the conduct of DICKENS, which was a battle emerging from a compromise.

Neither Eaker nor his deputy, Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, expected much from the bombing of Cassino. For his part, Alexander did not expect the air forces to strangle German supplies either, but as the JCS was anxious for territorial gains and yet averse to the battles of attrition in Italy that were absorbing men at a disturbing rate, and as Clark supported the JCS, Alexander agreed to the use of heavy bombers at Cassino and also to Eaker’s new interdiction programme from March until DIADEM began. The bombing of Cassino was tentative and experimental, for the senior airmen had not much confidence in it. Alexander thought that it would save lives, as did Freyberg, who had a strong interest in not wasting them. In fact everyone thought that there was nothing to lose by trying it, and in any case that it would be unwise to resist the advice of Washington.

The mistake made by the

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